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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the holographic document which is entirely in dece-

dent's handwriting and contains the decedent's handwritten name
in the body of the document satisfy the holographic will requirements of Utah Code Ann, §75-2-503, including the requirement that
the holographic will contain the Decedent's "signature?"
2.

Was the issue of whether or not the holographic document

contained the decedent's signature properly before the Court of
Appeals?
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is
reported in Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085 (Utah App.
1988) and 98 Utah Adv. Rep- 64 (Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1988).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1.

The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals of which review

is sought was entered on December 23, 1988.
2.

The Court of Appeals' Order Denying Rehearing was entered

on January 26, 1989.

An Order granting an extension of time

within which to petition for writ of certiorari until March 2 \
1989 was entered by this Court on February 23, 1989.
3.

The statutory provision conferring the Utah Supreme Court

with jurisdiction to review the Decision in question by a Writ of
Certiorari is Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1988).

1

CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 (1978).

Holographic Will:

A will which does not comply with section 75-2502 is valid as a holographic will, whether or
not witnessed, if the signature and the material provisions are in the handwriting of the
testator.
If there are several holographic
wills in existence with conflicting provisions,
the holographic will which is established by
date or other circumstances to be the will that
was last executed shall control.
If it is
impossible to determine which will was last
executed, the consistent provisions of the
several wills shall be considered valid and the
inconsistent provisions shall be considered
invalid.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is a formal petition for the probate of a handwritten document consisting of three cards as the holographic will c:
Robert E. Erickson, the Decedent.

The holographic document \<as

admitted to probate by the Third District Court, Salt Lake Count;
the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. On appeal, the Utah StarCourt of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that tholographic document did not meet the requirements of Utah Czz
Ann. §75-2-503 to qualify as a holographic will.
Statement of the Facts
Robert E. Erickson ("decedent") died on June 16, 1983. A
dated June 9, 1955 was admitted to probate and First InterstBank, N.A., was appointed as personal representative of :
estate.

(R. 19-22, 26-27).

The personal representative of t

2

estate is the respondent in this matter.

Tatsumi Misaka, the

petitioner herein, filed a petition (R. 70-81) seeking the prcbate
of a holographic document consisting of three 3" x 5" cards, which
were discovered among the effects of the decedent following the
probate of the prior will (R. 84).
The holographic document, a copy of which is located in the
Appendix, begins as follows:
Last Will & Test
I Robert E. Erickson do hereby state that I
leave and bequeath to the following persons of
my family and others.-..
Approximately two-thirds of the way down the first card, in the
middle of a sentence, the writing changes from blue to black ink.
The remainder of the first card and all of the second and third
cards are written in the black ink. Additionally, the underlined
date "8/22/73" was subsequently added to the upper right hand
corner of the first card, as shown by the underlined date being
in black ink and partially covering the letter "L" at the beginning of the words "Last Will & Test."

(3-P).

Under the holographic document, Mr. Misaka is the beneficiary
of a one-half interest in a Park City condominium and is noted as
the owner of a one-fourth interest in the "F. H. Store."

(3-? .

Mr. Misaka and the decedent were co-investors and partners pricr
to decedent's death (R. 131), and Mr. Misaka had filed a claiagainst the estate for an interest in the Park City condomim^and other properties based on the business association between >'r.
Misaka and decedent (R. 75-81), which claim was denied by tre
3

personal representative. The personal representative objected to
the probate of the holographic document (R. 82-83).
At trial, the holographic document was received into evidence
and Mr. Misaka presented expert testimony that the entire holographic document, which includes the name of the decedent in the body
of the document, was in the decedent's handwriting.

(R. 143).

The personal representative presented evidence regarding the
physical form of the handwritten name of decedent, testamentary
intent, and testamentary capacity. Following the trial, the Court
rejected the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order
submitted by the Personal Representative (R. 112-119), accepted
the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (R. 122-125) submitted by Mr. Misaka, and entered an Order admitting the holographic document to probate as the will of the decedent.

(R. 121-

122).
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the personal represen
tative raised two points:

Point I, "There was no testamentar

intent to have the cards made as the holographic will of th
decedent," and Point II, "The nature of the cards themselves fa.
to establish a testamentary disposition of the property of t
decedent."

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court

decision on a third issue, finding that Mr. Misaka had failed
prove that the decedent intended that his handwritten name in t
body of the holographic document be his "signature," and therefc
that Mr. Misaka had failed to meet his burden of establish

4

prima facia proof that the holographic document contained the
decedent's signature as required by Utah Code Ann, §75-2-503.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

A.

THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS POWERS OF SUPERVISION
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS1 DECISION
IMPROPERLY DECIDES THE CASE
MR. MISAKA MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC
DOCUMENT CONTAINS THE DECEDENT'S SIGNATURE,
1.

The Language In The Holographic Document Establishes The
Decedent's Intent That His Handwritten Name Be His
Signature.

Title 75 of the Utah Code Ann. is the Utah Uniform Probate
Code, which adopted the Uniform Probate Code for the State of
Utah. See 1975 Laws of Utah, Ch. 150. The execution requirements
for wills under the Utah Uniform Probate Code ("UUPC") are set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§75-2-502 and -503 (1978).

These

sections provide in relevant part as follows: "Except as provided
for holographic wills, ... every will shall be in writing signed
by the testator . . . and shall be signed by at least two persons
each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's
acknowledgement of the signature or of the will."
§75-2-502 (1978).

Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 (1978) provides _\

exception to those execution requirements for holographic wills:
"A will which does not comply with Section 75-2-502 is valid as
a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature ana
the material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator.

5

Neither §75-2-502 nor -503 requires that the testator's
signature appear at the end of the will; in fact, the official
comments to the Uniform Probate Code specifically refute such a
requirement:
There is no requirement that the testatorf s
signature be at the end of the will; thus, if
he writes his name in the body of the will and
intends it to be his signature, this would
satisfy the statute. The intent is to validate
wills that meet the minimum formalities of the
statute.
Editorial Board Comment to Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate
Code.
The requirement of a signature under Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503
could be used to accomplish a variety of purposes, not all of
which are consistent with the existing legislative intent to allow
a will to be signed in the body of the document.

The signature

requirement could act to identify the testator and to prevent
fraud due to the difficulty of forging a signature. The signature
requirement could further act to show the testator's understanding
of the importance and legal significance which accompanies a will
and that the testator intends the document, whether or no
presently completed, to be his will.

Finally, the signatur

requirement could act to show the finality of the instrument c
to protect against deletions of portions of the will.
In its Opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals interpret
the signature requirement of the Utah statute as including t
purpose of showing the finality of the will:
"The purpose of our statutory scheme is to
require a course of conduct which assures that
6

a person's will is reduced to handwriting, and
when handwritten, that the intention is to have
the writing take legal effect be indicated by
a signature which records the fact. The signature requirement shows that the writer finally
approved the writing and meant for it to be
operative as a testamentary instrument."
Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah App.
1988).
The Court of Appeal's interpretation would be consistent with
a statute requiring that a will be signed at the end, but is
inconsistent with the UUPC and the Editorial Board Comment to
Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code which allow a signature
in the body of the will.

In allowing wills to be signed in the

body, the UUPC implicitly rejects the possible purpose that the
signature act to show the finality of a will.

A will which is

signed in the body is necessarily signed before the written
language of the will is complete. Thus, the "signature" requirement of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 should not be construed to mean
that the hcindwritten name must be placed on the will to show a
final approval of the completed document.

Imposing a requirement

of a specific intent that the handwritten name in the body of the
will be put there for the purpose of authenticating the completed
will defeats the legislative intent of allowing a will to be
signed in the body, and also defeats the broad purpose of the
Uniform

Probate Code to

"validate wills whenever possible."

General Comment to Part 5, Editorial Board Comment of the Uniform
Probate Code.

7

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals implies further that the
signature requirement under the UUPC is also intended to protect
against deletions.

"Without more, it is an inadequate guard

against writing being deleted..."

Erickson, 766 P.2d at 1088.

Again, such a purpose is consistent only with a will statute
requiring a signature at the end. The intent of the UUPC to allow
a will to be signed in the body implicitly indicates that the
purposes for the signature requirement do not include safeguarding
the will against deletions, because a signature in the body of the
will does not serve to indicate an absolute ending, as a signature
at the end would.
While the Utah statute does not support a requirement that the
signature act to show finality or to guard against deletions, the
Editorial

Board Comment to Section 2-502 provides

that the

testator's handwritten name in the body of the will should be
intended to be a "signature," indicating that more is require<
than just a name in the body of the will.

This Court should fin

that the purpose of the signature requirement under the UUPC i
to show the testator's understanding of the legal significance c
the act he is undertaking, that is, the act of making a will
The signature requirement should be construed to validate wil.
containing the testator's handwritten name in the body of the wi
in a context which demonstrates the testatorf s operative inte
for the language to follow, showing the testator's understandi
of the importance and legal significance of the document bea
prepared, and thus authenticating the will.
8

The Court of Appeals has improperly given no weight to the
language immediately surrounding the Testator's handwritten name
in the exordium clause.

The language "I Robert E. Erickson do

hereby state that I leave and bequeath..." immediately underneath
the title "Last Will & Test," shows clear operative intent that
the document he was preparing serve as his will.

The Testator

could hardly have expressed his intent more clearly. The language
"do hereby state" shows the intent of the Testator to validate the
will with the handwritten name which immediately precedes those
words.
The courts in other states have recognized a handwritten name
in an exordium clause to be evidence of an intent to validate or
authenticate the will by placing the name in that context.

In

Smith v. McDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972) the court
validated the will which began "I, Julian Leland Rutherford...do
hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last will and
testament..«"

The same court, in Nelson v. Texarkana Historical

Socfy and Museum, 257 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 882 (1972) found the
signature requirement not met where the testator's handwritten
name only appeared in the context of stating that certain property
was given in memory of the testator. The California Supreme Court
has adopted a standard even broader than the proposed standard,
finding that intent to sign can be shown by the handwritten name
of the testator in the phrase "Bonds belonging solely to Helene
I. Bloch."
(1952).

In re Blocks Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21

Two of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in
9

Footnote 3 of its Opinion to support the courtf s statement that
in proper circumstances a handwritten name in the body of the will
could be written with the intent to be a signature actually
support the probate of the present holographic document.

Those

cases found handwritten names in the body of the wills to be
signatures based solely on language in the will, similar to the
language in the present holographic document, supporting the
testator's operative intent for the document•

See In re Estate

of Glass, 165 Cal. App.2d 380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958) (signature
requirement met where will provided "This is Louis R. Glass

I

wish to Retract my last Will witch I left my sister Ester Glass
now Mrss Zipkin & give my belongings

to my Three Nefeu &

Nice....") and Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964) (signature requirement met by exordium clause which provided "That I,
Roy Wheeler Bell, of Harris Co. Tex being of sound disposing mine
memory, do hereby make this my last will & testament, hereby
revoking any & all other wills heretofore made by me").

In In r

Estate of Fegley, 42 Colo. App. 47, 589 P.2d 80 (1978), the cour
addressed the question of whether the testator's signature i
required at the end of a will under Colorado's version of tl
Uniform Probate Code, which contains a holographic will provisic
identical to the relevant portion of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-50
The court held that

"the intent of the testator -- not t

location of his name -- is the crucial factor in determini
whether a holographic will has been signed within the meaning
[the Colorado holographic will statute]."
10

Id. at 81.

The coi

determined that the testator lacked the necessary testamentary
intent that a will have immediate effect because the holographic
document contained the phrase "witness my hand...," followed by
a blank signature space and an attestation clause, which the court
saw as indicating that the testator intended to sign the will at
a later date, and that the testator did not intend her name in the
body of the will to be her signature. The conclusion of the court
in Fegley is consistent with the proposed standard because the
format of the will, containing a blank signature space followed
by an attestation clause, indicated that the testator intended to
take further action to validate the will.
Finding that a will contains a signature in situations which
demonstrate the testator's operative intent for the language to
follow is not contrary to the general statutory

definition of

"signature" contained in Utah Code Ann. §68-3~12(2)(r) (Supp.
1988) that a signature is "any name, mark or sign written with the
intent to authenticate any instrument or writing" because the
language preceding that definition provides that H[T]he following
definitions shall be observed, unless the definition would be
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, or
repugnant to the context of the statute."

Id. at §68-3-12(2).

By allowing signatures in the body of a will, the legislature has
implicitly approved

"authenticating" the writing

following a

signature in the body of a will.
2.

The Decedent's Subsequent Dating Of The Holographic
Document Adopted The Handwritten Name As A Signature.

11

In addition to the language in the exordium, the decedent
dated the holographic document after it was written, thereby
acknowledging and adopting the handwritten name in the exordium
clause as his signature.

The subsequent dating of the will

indicates that Mr. Erickson had completed the will and done
everything he intended to do.

Case law supports the concept of

a person "adopting" a prior handwritten name as a signature.

In

In re Kinney's Estate, 16 Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940), the
court found the signature adopted based on the will being "complete."

The court said that a will was not complete if it

appeared from the instrument that the decedent had not "done
everything they intended to do."

See also Estate of McCarty, 2"

Cal. Rptr. 94, 211 Cal. App.2d 23 (1962) (signature adopted b<
underlining at later date).
3.

Decedentfs Intent That The Handwritten Name Be Hi
Signature Can Be Inferred From The Existence of Testamen
tary Intent.

The Court of Appeals1

Opinion reads into the statute

specific intent requirement that the testator's handwritten nar
be "written with the intent that it operate as an authenticati<
of the document as a will" to accompany the general
requirement that testamentary intent be present.

mte

Erickson, 7

P.2d at 1088. Reaching the conclusion that a person intended
entire document, including the handwritten name, to be a will, t
that the will is invalid because no specific intent to sign <
will is shown, is a conclusion that defies the purpose of the U1
to validate wills whenever possible. If the handwritten name m
12

be placed in the will with the specific intent of authenticating
the completed document as a will, then the existence of testamentary intent should allow an inference to be drawn that a name
written in the body of the will was done with the intent that it
be a signature and authenticate the document.

The trial court

found the existence of testamentary intent regarding the holographic document at issue, based on extrinsic evidence as well as the
document itself.

That testamentary intent infers the existence

of the decedent's intent that his handwritten name was placed m
exordium clause to authenticate the will, especially in light of
the surrounding language in the exordium clause.
4.

The Form Of The Holographic Document Does Not Negate The
Decedent's Signatory Intent.

The Court of Appeals' Opinion addresses several aspects cf
the holographic document which should bear no weight as to either
the issue of whether the will contains a signature or the issue
of testamentary intent. The fact that the will is written on tne
unlined side of index cards does not in any way imply a lack ::
either intent to sign or tesramentary intent.

The relevart

inquiry is what was written, not the material which contains tre
writing. The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that inunater:-.
language on pre-printed
holographic wills.
App. 1987).

forms can be ignored

in validati

Estate of Fitzgerald, 738 P.2d 236 (Utah C:.

In the same manner, the use of the lined or "-e

unlined side of the cards is irrelevant.

13

The fact that the index cards are not attached to each other
has no bearing on signatory intent or testamentary intent.

This

Court addressed that issue in In re Lovefs Estate, 75 Utah 342,
285 P.299 (1930), stating that several loose or detached sheets
may serve as a will if, as is the present case, the sheets can be
coherently read together as a will and contain nothing out of
harmony with the general conception of a will.

The present

holographic document meets that standard.
The Court of Appeals stated in its Opinion that the nature of
the holographic document suggests that it was unfinished or
constituted a draft.

By allowing laymen to prepare holographic

wills, the Utah statute sets a priority on carrying out the
testator's intent rather than on the form of the instrument.
Admittedly, the holographic document at issue is crude, but that
crudeness does not bear on the requisites for a valid holographic
will.

The fact that the first card was subsequently datec

indicates that the will was completed. Nothing in the holographic
document indicates that the decedent intended to take any furthe
action to complete the will.

The mere fact that the deceden

could have disposed of additional property if he chose to do s
does not support a conclusion that the will is incomplete
especially where decedent's prior will is not revoked by tt
holographic document at issue.

Even if the holographic documei

was not completed, however, the broad purpose of the UUPC
validate wills whenever possible should support validating a wi
which otherwise meets the statutory requirements. In the prese
14

case, the clear language of the exordium clause and the subsequent
dating are far better evidence of the testator's intent to sign
the will than the rough nature of the documents.
In regard to the possibility that the cards were a "draft,"
an intent to later prepare a more formal document does not
preclude or detract from the testator's intent in regard to an
earlier document.

In re Kutter's Estate, 160 Cal. App.2d 322,

325, P-2d 624, 631 (1958); Richberg v. Robbins, 33 Tenn. App. 66,
228 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1950); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d
456, 461 (W.Va. 1982).
B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT BASED
ON AN ISSUE NOT RAISED ON APPEAL.
The personal representative did not raise the issue at trial

or on appeal of whether the decedent intended his handwritten name
to be his "signature."

As stated by the Court of Appeals in its

Opinion in this case, "the parties and the court below seem to
have focused on the broader issue of whether decedent intended
these cards to be his will...," Erickson, 766 P.2d at 1087, and
ff

[T]he findings and conclusions entered by the trial court, as

well as the appellate briefs for both parties, fail to distinguish
intent for these two different purposes."

Ld. at 1087 fn. 2.

At the trial, the Personal Representative of the Estate, the
Appellant herein, raised only the issue that testamentary intent
did not exist regarding the will.

(R-128-175).

See specifically

the Personal Representative's argument for dismissal following Mr.
Misaka's evidence (R 147-150) and closing argument (R 171-173).

15

In arguing that testamentary intent was lacking, the Personal
Representative did cite In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248
P.2d 21 (1952) regarding affixing the signature with intent to
authenticate (R-148), but did so only as part of his argument that
testamentary intent was lacking.

Bloch's Estate's broad holding

finding an intent to sign where the handwritten name was used in
describing property of the decedent actually supports a finding
of an intent to sign in the present case.

Further, while the

issue of intent to sign was also addressed in the Personal
Representative's discussion of points (R 106-111), that document
was filed some 17 days after trial and 12 days after the Court's
Order (R 104), and contained no legal authority on the issue
except a citation to 19 A.L.R.2d 926.

The Personal Represen-

tative's brief filed with the Court of Appeals addressed directly
only the issue of testamentary intent, while in that discussion
addressing intent to authenticate as part of that overall testamentary intent.
While it is proper for a court on appeal to affirm based oi
grounds not raised at the trial level, see Branch v. Wester
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982), this Court ha
repeatedly held that an issue will not be considered for the firs
time on appeal in cases where the new issue is raised to revers
the trial court's decision.

See, e.g., Traynor v. Cushing, 6f

P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984).

As the Court of Appeals stated

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987):
"Theories or issues which are not apparent or
reasonably discernable from the pleadings,
16

affidavits, and exhibits will not be considered."
Minnehoma Fin. Co, v. Pauli, 565 P.2d
835, 838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, even if
pleadings are generously interpreted, if they
are not supported by any factual showing or by
the submission of legal authority, they are not
presented for decision.
In the present case, the Personal Representative's failure to
clearly raise the issue of whether the decedent intended his
handwritten name to be his signature falls within the perimeters
of James v. Preston, and should not have been considered by the
Court of Appeals on appeal.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS RENDERED AN IMPORTANT DECISION
OF STATE LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE,
DECIDED BY THIS COURT.
As recognized by the Court of Appeals, the issue presented in
this case of the requirements of a signature in the body of a
holographic will is one of first impression in Utah.

Erickson,

766 P.2d at 1086 fn.l. While the issue has been addressed in many
other jurisdictions, see Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 926 (1951), the Court
in In re Fegley, 42 Colo- App. 47, 589 P. 2d 80 (1978) is the only
court to have addressed the issue in a jurisdiction which has
adopted the Uniform Probate Code.

The issue in the present case

is important in the context of the UUPC and its stated intent to
"validate wills whenever possible," Editorial Board Comment to the
Uniform Probate Code, General Comment to Part 5, and to "validate
wills that meet the minimum formalities of the statute."

Id. ,

Comment to Section 2-502. The likelihood of laymen succeeding in
17

carrying out their intended testamentary disposition will be
significantly reduced if the Court of Appeals' Decision is allowed
to stand.

It is unlikely that any holographic will would contain

any language in the will itself indicating an intent to sign
significantly clearer than the language in the present holographic
document.

Therefore, this case is important in determining

whether the legislative intent to allow wills to be signed in the
body of the document will be given real meaning, or whether it
will be allowed in name only, subject to a standard of proof
regarding intent to sign which is effectively unmeetable. As the
California Supreme Court stated in Estate of Black, 641 P.2d 754
(1982), the California Supreme Court stated:
If testators are to be encouraged by a statute
like ours to draw their own wills, the courts
should not adopt, upon purely technical reasoning, a construction which would result in
invalidating such wills in half the cases.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Tatsumi Misaka, prays that the Court
grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted this «*- /

day of March, 1989.

WATKISS & CAMPBELL
\JL^^

-1-

^ryi &

KEN P. J^NES
Attorneys, If or Respondent,
Tatsumi Misaka
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Petition for Writ of Certiorari were caused to be hand-delivered
upon Randy S. Ludlow, Attorney for Respondent, 311 South State
Street, Suite 280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 127-*--' day of
March, 1989.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

/CLx,
r-SV.^^KEN P. JONES \
Attorneys for Respondent,
TatsumiNMisaka
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APPENDIX

1.

Copy of Court of Appeals' Decision, Estate of Erickson v.
Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1988).

2.

Copy of Utah State Court of Appeals' Order Denying Rehearing
dated January 26, 1989.

3.

Copy of the Holographic Will of Robert E. Erickson.
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert
E. ERICKSON, Deceased, Appellant,
TaUumi MISAKA, Respondent
No. 880139-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 23, 1988.
A petition for probate of three handwritten three-inch by five-inch cards as decedent's holographic will was filed. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
John A. Rokich, J., admitted the cards to
probate, and personal representative appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,
held that there was no evidence that decedent's name was written in the introductory clause on one card with the intent that it
constitute authentication of one or all of
the cards as a will
Final judgment and order vacated
1. Wills *=>133

Decedent's intent is crucial factor in
determining whether purported holographic will has been signed within meaning of
statute pertaining to execution of wills.
U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503.
2. Wills «=>130, 131
Although statutory requirements for
execution of valid holographic wills are
minimal, statute is mandatory and not directory, holographic document is invalid as
will-despite deceased's clear intent that document will be will-unless document complies with governing statute UC.A.1953,
7S-2-503.
3. Wills e»133
Decedent's handwritten name in body
of purported holographic will is not, by
itself, prima facie evidence that document
contains decedent's signature; handwritten
name must have been written with intent
that it operate as authentication of document as will in order for it to be signature. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-12(2Xr), 75-2-503.

fUS
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4 WBt«»lU
'' fhfee handwritten three-inch by fiveinch cards were inadmissible as holograph
will despite fact that decedent's name was
written in introductory clause on one card;
thera was no evidence that decedent's
name was written with intent that it constitute authentication of one or ail of cards as
will. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503.
5. Wills *»133
It is possible for handwritten name at
beginning of body of will to be written with
intent that it be requisite signature, but
there must be support in evidence for that
intent
Randy S. Ludlow (argued), Salt Lake
City, for appellant
Herscheil J. Saperstein, Ken P. Jones
(argued), Watkiss and Campbell, Salt Lake
City, for respondent
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and
JACKSON, JJ.
JACKSON, Judge:
Robert E. Eriekson died in June 1983.
Hit form** wiB, executed June 9,1956, was
admitted to probate in July 1988 and the
designated personal representative appointed. Iii October 1986, respondent Tatsumi
Misaka filed a petition for probate of three
handwritten 3" x 5' cards as Erickson's
holographic wflL In this appeal, the personal representative challenges the trial
court's admission of the cards to probate.
Because we conclude there is insufficient
evidence that Eriekson intended his handwritten name on one of the cards to be his
•ngjMtart for purposes of Utah Code Ann.
( 75-2-608 (1978), we vacate the final order and judgment below.

In re WoleotVs Estate, 54 Utah 165,180 P.
169 (1919). The introductory Editorial
Board Comment to Part 5 of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code,1 Utah Code Ann.
§§ 7^-2-501 through -513 (1978), notes
that its provisions are intended to validate
a will whenever possible. This goal is
achieved, in part, by keeping the formalities for a written and attested will to a
minimum, see section 75-2-502, and by authorizing holographic wills written and
signed by the testator
A will which does not comply with
section 75-2-502 [requiring, among other
things, the signatures of two witnesses]
is valid as a holographic will, whether or
not witnessed, if the signature and the
material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator
Utah Code Ann. § 7&-2-50S (1978) (emphasis added). As the Editorial Board Comment to section 75-2-502 makes clear, the
requisite signature need not be at the end
of a will. If the testator "writes his name
in the body of the will and intends it to be
his signature, this would satisfy the statute." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the decedent's intent is the crucial factor in determining whether a purported holographic
will has been signed within the meaning of
section 75-2-508. See In re Estate of Fegley, 42 ColoJtpp. 47, 589 P.2d 80, 81 (1978)
(construing identical statute).

[1] The right to dispose of property by
will is governed and controlled by statute.

[2] Although the statutory requirements for execution of a valid holographic
will are minimal, the statute is mandatory
and not directory. A holographic document is invalid as a will—despite the deceased's clear intent that the document be
a will—unless the document complies with
the governing statute. In Re Wolcott's
Estate, 180 P. at 170 (decided under prior
statute requiring holographic will to be entirely written, dated, and signed by testa-

1. The issue presented in this appeal in one of
first impression in this state. Utah is one of
sixteen states to adopt ail or part of the Uniform
Probate Code since 1972. See Utah Code Ann.
S§ 75-1-101 to 7S-S-101 (1978) (effective July
1, 19711. The others are: Alaska (1973); Arizona (1974); Colorado (1974); Florida (1975); Hawaii (1976k Idaho (1972); Kentucky (1976)

(ooly Art VII, Part 1); Maine (1961); Michigan
(1979); Minnesota (1975); Montana (1975); Nebraska (1977); New Mexico (1976); North Dakota (1975); and South Carolina (19S7). Due to
the recency of adoption by only a small minority of states, there is a dearth of case law construing the provisions of the Uniform Probate
Code.

ESTATE OF ERICKSON T. MISAKA
OfmlU
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tor). Sm 2 Page on the Law of Wills
i 20.4 (W.&m* k D. Parker ed 1960).
Under Ufch Code Ann. § 75-3-407
(1978), proponents of wills in contested
cases always have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of their due execution, while contestants bear the burden of
establishing lack of testamentary intent
See In re Estate of Olschansky, 735 P.2d
927, 929 (1987).
The proof in support of probate must be
sufficient to convince the court that the
paper produced is the lawful will of the
testator.
A prima facie case is made when it is
shown that all the requirements of law
have been observed in fee execution of
the will, and unless such prima facie case
is made the court should refuse probate
even where probate is not contested. G.
Thompson, The Law of Wills, 3rd Ed.,
§ 199.
In re Estate of Craddocky 179 Mont 74,
586 P.2d 292, 294 (1978) (proponent failed
to establish prima facie case that purported
holographic will was written entirely by
testator, as required by statute).
Applying these principles to the instant
case, it was respondent Misaka's burden to
make a prima facie showing that the purported holographic will contained the "signature" required by section 75-2-508. On
this issue, respondent introduced only the
three unnumbered and unattached cards,
which were apparently discovered in a desk
drawer along with other belongings of decedent They read as follows, with unreadable portions indicated:
8/22/73 Last Will + Tett I
Robert £. Enekaoo do
hereby state that I leave
and hnqneati to the following persons of my family + othen ea My demiae
I want to leere to my wife
Dorothy Erieksoo tie

the F H Store shall go {U
to Dorothy Vi to REE
Jr "A to Sheryl [unreadable] the other V« ui owned
by T Miaaka The condominium at Park City m to
go To 74 REE Jr l/< to
Sheryl + l* T T [Madaka

2. The finding! and conclusions entered by the
trial court, as well as the appellate briefs of both
parties, fail to distinguish "intent" for these two
different purposes. The distinction is pointed
out in Note, Wills—Validity of Signature for
Holographic Wills, 28 Ark.L.Rev 521 (1975), discussing Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Soc'y and
Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 882 (1974),
and Smt
v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481
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home at 1378 Blaine Ave or Maaaka] My Interest in
until she remarries, after Nevada Scratch to Go to
which the
home shall be
Dorothy in Total
sold +. l/i go to her ¥ l/«to
REE Jr + V« to Sheryl
Ann Enckaon
My Insurance to cover my
interest in the Holladay
store to go to Dorothy in
Total—160,000 or more,
other stock interestsSome Zions Utah Bank
[Craft or Croft] to go To
Sheryl +• Bobby Share +
Share alike

On the basis of these writings, respondent Misaka is claiming a one-half interest
in Erickson's Park City condominium.
Without admission ot the index cards to
probate as a valid holographic will, Misaka
takes nothing; the distribution of the property is controlled by the terms of Eriekson's formal 1955 will
Although the parties and the court below
seem to have focused on the broader issue
of whether decedent intended these cards
to be a will, the relevant inquiry is whether
the evidence is sufficient to show decedent
Erickson intended that his handwritten
name near the top one of the cards be his
signature.2 Misaka offered no evidence extrinsic to the cards themselves as proof of
Erickson's intent The trial court concluded the three index cards contained the "signature" required by section 75-2-503 for a
valid holographic will, without specifying
the particulars in the three cards relied on
to implicitly find that Erickson intended his
handwritten name to be his signature.
This determination of the decedent's intent,
based solely on the trial court's examination of the purported will, is a matter of
law, see In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342,
285 P 299 (1930), which we review on appeal under a correction-of-error standard.
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376,
1378 (Utah 1987).
[3] In the definitions provided by the
legislature to guide construction of Utah
S.W^d 741 (1972). In Nelson, as m this case,
the evidence extrinsic to the purported will itself
went only to the question of general testamentary intent, i.e., did the decedent intend the writing to be a will, not to whether she intended her
name in the body of the instrument to be her
signature. Nelson, 257 Ark. at 398, 516 S.W.2d
at 884.

ftgg:

Vtsh
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atjrt^l^hrignature" is defined as including "w&lmam, mark, or sign written with
the intent to authenticate any instrument
or
writing."
Utah
Code
Ann.
I 68-3-12(2Xr) (1988). A decedent's handwritten name in the body of the purported
holographic will is not, by itself, prima
faae evidence that the document contains
the decedent's signature. In the context of
section 75-2-503, such a handwntten name
must have been written with the intent that
it operate as an authentication of the document as a will m order for it to be a
signature. The purpose of our statutory
scheme is to require a course of conduct
which assures that a person's will is reduced to writing and, when handwntten,
that the intention to have the wnting take
legal effect be indicated by a signature
which irecords that fact The signature
requirement shows that the wnter finally
approved the wnting and meant for it to be
operative as a testamentary instrument
See Mcchem, The Rule m Lemayne v
Stanley, 29 Mieh.L.Rev. 685, 690-96 (1931)
[41 (>ur review of the purported holographic will in this case leads us to conclude that it does not contain the signature
required by the statute before it can be
admitted to probate. The three cards in
evidence are index cards on which only the
unhned sides have been written. They
were not attached to each other. There is
no concluding language on any of the
cards, and they otherwise give no indication that they are, taken together, a completed document Indeed, the nature of the
note cards, the use of abbreviations, lack of
punctuation, and the perfunctory, open-ended wording strongly suggest that the
cards,'as a document, are unfinished or
constitute a draft

E. Enckson do hereby state/' the wnting
contains nothing indicating the name was
intended as the required executing signature. There is nothing on the face of the
cards to affirmatively or by necessary implication suggest that decedent wrote his
name for any other purpose than to identify himself as the wnter See In re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 P 404
(1925); see generally, Annotation, Place of
Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.li
R.2d 926, 939-44 (1951). In short, there is
no evidence that decedent's name was written m the introductory clause on one card
with the intent that it constitute authentication of one or all of the cards as a will.
Respondent, therefore, failed to make a
prima faae showing that the purported
holographic will contained the authenticating signature required by section 75-2-503.
[5] It is, of course, possible for a handwritten name at the beginning of the body
of a will to be wntten with the intent that
it be the requisite signature.1 However,
there must be support in the evidence for
that intent Standing alone, it is equivocal,
leaving the decedent's final approval and
authentication of the writing in doubt
Without more, it is an inadequate guard
against wnting being deleted, a possibility
in this case if additional cards were wntten
upon by Enckson only to be lost, misplaced, or discarded by him or others.
The final judgment and order of the trial
court admitting the cards to probate as
decedent's holographic will is vacated.
Costs to appellant
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ, concur

Although the handwntten name of the
decedent appears in the phrase "I Robert
3. £ * , Smith v. MacDonaU 252 Ark. 931. 4*1
S.WJd 741 (1972) (handwntten name in tide
and exordium clause constitutes signature required by statute); In re Estate of Glass. 165
CaLAptUd 3^0, 331 ?2d 1045 (1958) (handwntten name in h^Hirg of document. This is
Louis R. Glass"); Burton v Bell, 380 S W 2d 561
(Tex, 1964) (handwntten name in exordium
clause, That I, Roy Wheeler Bell.
," is signature rec|uired for holographic will) Bui see In
re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal 36. 239 P 404

(1925) (no intent that name in exordium be
signature where document terminated abruptly
after a specific bequest), Estate of Fegley, 42
ColoApp. 47. 5S9 P 2d 80 (1978) (phrase at end
of instrument "witness my hand
* followed
by blank signature space indicates decedent intended to sign later and did not intend handwntten name in exordium clause to be her
signature), Davis v Davis, 86 Okla. 255, 207 P
1065 (1922) (same phrase and result as fegley)

APPENDIX 2
UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of the Estate
of Robert E. Erickson,
Deceased,
Appellant,
v.
Tatsumi Misaka,
Respondent.

ORDER
No, 880139-CA

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Rehearing
filed by the respondent, Tatsumi Misaka•
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondent's petition for
rehearing is denied.
Dated th is

tlptttoiay

of January, 1989.
FOR THE COURT:

gfrft.
Mary T/ Noonan
of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on 27, January 1989 I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by depositing the same with the
United States Mail, postage prepaid to the following:

Randy S. Ludlow
Attorney for Appellant
311 South State, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Herschell J. Saperstein
Ken P. Jones
Watkiss and Campbell
Attorneys for Respondent
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT
84101

DATED this 27th day of January, 1989,

By

Kathleen Flynn N
\J
Case Management Clerk
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